(a) Short title.—This Act may be cited as the “Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018”.

(b) Table of contents.—The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.
Sec. 3. Statement of policy on United States engagement in the Indo-Pacific region.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The Indo-Pacific region—

(A) represents nearly ¹⁄2 of the global population;

(B) is home to some of the most dynamic economies in the world; and

(C) poses security challenges that threaten to undermine United States national security interests, regional peace, and global stability.

(2) The core tenants of the United States-backed international system are being challenged with increasingly coercive behavior, including—

(A) China’s illegal construction and militarization of artificial features in the South China Sea;

(B) North Korea’s acceleration of its nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities; and

(C) the increased presence throughout Southeast Asia of the Islamic State (referred to in this Act as “ISIS”) and other international terrorist organizations that threaten the United States.

(3) The economic order in the Indo-Pacific region continues to transform, presenting both opportunities and challenges to United States economic interests.

(4) The United States has a fundamental interest in defending human rights and promoting the rule of law in the Indo-Pacific region. Although many countries in that region have improved the treatment of their citizens, several Indo-Pacific countries continue to be human rights abusers and there are serious concerns with political rights and civil liberties throughout the Indo-Pacific region.

(5) Without strong leadership from the United States, the international system, fundamentally rooted in the rule of law, may wither, to the detriment of United States, regional, and global interests. It is imperative that the United States continue to play a leading role in the Indo-Pacific region by—

(A) defending peace and security;

(B) advancing economic prosperity; and

(C) promoting respect for fundamental human rights.

(6) In 2017, the Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate held a series of hearings on United States leadership in the Indo-Pacific region, in which—

(A) experts, including Representative Randy Forbes, Ambassador Robert Gallucci, Ms. Tami Overby, Dr. Robert Orr, Ambassador Derek Mitchell, Ambassador Robert King, Mr. Murray Hiebert, and others detailed the security challenges, economic opportunities, and imperatives of promoting rule of law, human rights, and democracy, in the Indo-Pacific region; and

(B) Dr. Graham Allison, the Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, testified, “As realistic students of history, Chinese leaders recognize that the role the U.S. has played since World War II as the architect and underwriter of regional stability and security has been essential to the rise of Asia, including China itself. But they believe that as the tide that brought the U.S. to Asia recedes, America must leave with it. Much as Britain’s role in the Western Hemisphere faded at the beginning of the twentieth century, so must America’s role in Asia as the region’s historic superpower resumes its place.”.

(7) The United States National Security Strategy (referred to in this Act as the “National Security Strategy”), which was released in December 2017, states—

(A) “A geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order is taking place in the Indo-Pacific region. The region, which stretches from the west coast of India to the western shores of the United States, represents the most populous and economically dynamic part of the world. The U.S. interest in a free and open Indo-Pacific extends back to the earliest days of our republic.”; and

(B) “Our vision for the Indo-Pacific excludes no nation. We will redouble our commitment to established alliances and partnerships, while expanding and deepening relationships with new partners that share respect for sovereignty, fair and reciprocal trade, and the rule of law. We will reinforce our commitment to freedom of the seas and the peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime disputes in accordance with international law. We will work with allies and partners to achieve complete, ver­i­fi­a­ble, and irreversible denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and preserve the non-proliferation regime in Northeast Asia.”.

It is the policy of the United States to develop, and to commit to, a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive, multifaceted, and principled United States policy for the Indo-Pacific region that—

(1) preserves peace through strength by securing the vital national security interests of the United States;

(2) promotes American prosperity by advancing the economic interests of the United States;

(3) advances American influence by reflecting the values of the American people and universal human rights; and

(4) accords with and supports the rule of law and international norms.

(a) In general.—There are authorized to be appropriated for the Department of State, the United States Agency for International Development, and, as appropriate, the Department of Defense $1,500,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023, which shall be used—

(1) to advance United States foreign policy interests and objectives in the Indo-Pacific region in recognition of the value of diplomatic initiatives and programs in the furtherance of United States strategy;

(2) to bolster the United States military presence and readiness in the Indo-Pacific region for the purpose of deterring and defending against provocative actions, including by improving the defense infrastructure and critical munitions stockpiles of the United States Armed Forces;

(3) to improve the defense capacity of partner nations to resist coercion and to deter and defend against security threats, including through foreign military financing and international military education and training programs;

(4) to conduct regular bilateral and multilateral exercises, particularly with our most highly-capable allies and partners, to meet strategic challenges, including—

(A) certain destabilizing activities of the People’s Republic of China; and

(B) emerging threats, such as the nuclear and ballistic missile programs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea;

(5) to build new counterterrorism partnership programs in Southeast Asia to combat the growing presence of ISIS and other terrorist organizations that pose a significant threat to the United States, our allies, and our citizens’ interests abroad; and

(6) to increase maritime domain awareness programs in Southeast Asia—

(A) by expanding the scope of naval and coast guard training efforts with Southeast Asian countries;

(B) through intelligence sharing and other information-sharing efforts; and

(C) through multilateral exercises, including by involving Japan, Australia, and India in such efforts and exercises.

(b) Countering China’s influence To undermine the international system.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (a) shall be made available for United States Government efforts to counter the strategic influence of the People’s Republic of China, in accordance with the strategy required under section 7043(e)(3) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2014 (division K of Public Law 113–76; 128 Stat. 536) and in consultation with the appropriate committees of Congress.

(c) Burma.—None of the amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (a) may be made available for the programs, initiatives, or interactions that may benefit the defense sector of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (historically known as “Burma”).

(d) Philippines.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (a) may not be made available for counternarcotics assistance (other than maritime programs) for the Philippine National Police unless the Secretary of State certifies and reports to the appropriate committees of Congress that the Government of the Philippines has adopted and is implementing a counternarcotics strategy that complies with international norms of due process.

(e) Cambodia.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (a) may not be made available for certain United States assistance programs that benefit the Government of Cambodia.

(f) Defined term.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;

(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(3) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and

(4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(a) United States-Japan alliance.—The United States Government—

(1) is committed to the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, done at Washington, January 19, 1960, and subsequent security agreements;

(2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance between the United States and Japan in promoting peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region; and

(3) calls for the strengthening and broadening of diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United States and Japan.

(b) United States-Republic of Korea alliance.—The United States Government—

(1) is committed to the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea, done at Washington October 1, 1953, and subsequent security agreements;

(2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance between the United States and South Korea in promoting peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region; and

(3) calls for the strengthening and broadening of diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United States and the Republic of Korea.

(c) United States-Australia alliance.—The United States Government—

(1) is committed to the Security Treaty Between Australia and the United States of America, done at San Francisco September 1, 1951, and subsequent security agreements between these 2 nations;

(2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance between the United States and Australia in promoting peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region; and

(3) calls for the strengthening and broadening of diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United States and Australia.

(d) United States-Philippines alliance.—The United States Government is committed to the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America, done at Washington August 30, 1951, and subsequent bilateral security agreements, including the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, done at Manila April 28, 2014.

(e) Thailand.—The United States Government is committed to—

(1) the Agreement Respecting Military Assistance Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Thailand, done at Bangkok October 17, 1950;

(2) the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, done at Manila September 8, 1954; and

(3) all subsequent bilateral security agreements, including the Joint Vision Statement for the Thai-U.S. Defense Alliance, issued in Bangkok November 15, 2012.

(a) In general.—The United States Government—

(1) expresses grave concerns with Chinese actions that seek—

(A) to further constrain space for civil society within China; and

(B) to undermine a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region;

(2) encourages China to play a constructive role in world affairs by demonstrating consistent respect for the rule of law and international norms;

(3) seeks to build a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship with China—

(A) by expanding areas of cooperation; and

(B) by addressing areas of disagreement, including over human rights, economic policies, and maritime security; and

(4) is committed to working with China on shared regional and global challenges, especially—

(A) upholding and strengthening the rules-based international system; and

(B) the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

(b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States should—

(1) welcome China’s decision to change course and pursue responsible engagement on global issues;

(2) encourage China to play a constructive role in the Indo-Pacific region and globally; and

(3) continue to call out Chinese actions that undermine the rules-based international system.

(a) In general.—The United States Government—

(1) recognizes the vital role of the strategic partnership between the United States and India in promoting peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region;

(2) calls for the strengthening and broadening of diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United States and India; and

(3) is committed to—

(A) the New Framework for the United States-India Defense Relationship, done at Arlington, Virginia June 28, 2005;

(B) the United States-India Defense Technology and Trade Initiative, launched in 2012;

(C) the Joint Strategic Vision for the Indo-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region, announced on January 25, 2015; and

(D) all related and subsequent bilateral and security agreements.

(b) India as major defense partner.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Section 1292(a)(1)(A) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328; 130 Stat. 2559; 22 U.S.C. 2751 note) requires the recognition of India as a major defense partner.

(2) The designation of India as a major defense partner, which is unique to India—

(A) institutionalizes the progress made to facilitate defense trade and technology sharing between the United States and India;

(B) elevates defense trade and technology cooperation between the United States and India to a level commensurate with the closest allies and partners of the United States;

(C) facilitates technology sharing between the United States and India, including license-free access to a wide range of dual-use technologies, after taking into account national security concerns; and

(D) facilitates joint exercises, coordination on defense strategy and policy, military exchanges, and port calls in support of defense cooperation between the United States and India.

It is the sense of the Senate that the United States should—

(1) support and affirm the elevation of the United States-Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) relationship to a strategic partnership;

(2) recommit to ASEAN centrality by helping build a strong, stable, politically cohesive, economically integrated, and socially responsible community of nations that has common rules, norms, procedures, and standards which are consistent with international law and the principles of a rules-based Indo-Pacific community;

(3) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to foster greater integration among its members;

(4) recognize the value of—

(A) ASEAN engagement with economic, political, and security partners within Asia and elsewhere, including Australia, Canada, the European Union, India, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan; and

(B) strategic economic initiatives, such as the U.S.-ASEAN Connect, which demonstrate a commitment to ASEAN and the ASEAN Economic Community and build upon economic relationships in the Indo-Pacific region;

(5) support efforts by the nations comprising ASEAN—

(A) to address maritime and territorial disputes in a constructive manner; and

(B) to pursue claims through peaceful, diplomatic, and legitimate regional and international arbitration mechanisms, consistent with international law, including through the adoption of a code of conduct in the South China Sea to further promote peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region;

(6) support efforts by United States partners and allies in ASEAN—

(A) to enhance maritime capability and maritime domain awareness;

(B) to protect unhindered access to, and use of, international waterways in the Asia-Pacific region that are critical to ensuring the security and free flow of commerce;

(C) to counter piracy;

(D) to disrupt illicit maritime trafficking activities such as the trafficking of persons, goods, and drugs; and

(E) to enhance the maritime capabilities of countries or regional organizations to respond to emerging threats to maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region; and

(7) urge ASEAN member states to develop a common approach to reaffirm the decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling with respect to the case between the Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China.

It is the sense of Congress that the President should develop a strategy to deepen the trilateral security cooperation between the United States, South Korea, and Japan, including missile defense, intelligence-sharing, and other defense-related initiatives.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the security dialogue between the United States, Australia, India, and Japan is vital to addressing pressing security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region in order to promote—

(A) a rules-based order;

(B) respect for international law; and

(C) a free and open Indo-Pacific; and

(2) such a dialogue is intended to augment, rather than to replace, current mechanisms.

(a) Indonesia.—The United States Government is committed to—

(1) the U.S.-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership, done in Washington November 9, 2010;

(2) the Joint Statement on Comprehensive Defense Cooperation, done in Washington October 26, 2015; and

(3) all related and subsequent bilateral and security agreements between the United States and Indonesia.

(b) Malaysia.—The United States Government is committed to—

(1) the U.S.-Malaysia Comprehensive Partnership, done at Putrajaya April 27, 2014;

(2) the Joint Statement for Enhancing the Comprehensive Partnership between the United States of America and Malaysia, done in Washington September 13, 2017; and

(3) all related and subsequent bilateral and security agreements between the United States and Malaysia.

(c) Singapore.—The United States Government is committed to—

(1) the Strategic Framework Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Singapore for a Closer Cooperation Partnership in Defense and Security, done at Washington July 12, 2005;

(2) the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, done at Arlington, Virginia December 7, 2015; and

(3) all related and subsequent bilateral and security agreements between the United States and Singapore.

(d) Vietnam.—The United States Government is committed to—

(1) the U.S.-Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership, done at Washington December 16, 2013;

(2) the U.S.-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement on Defense Relations, done at Hanoi on June 1, 2015;

(3) the U.S.-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement, done at Washington May 31, 2017; and

(4) all related and subsequent bilateral and security agreements between the United States and Vietnam.

(e) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States should deepen the diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation, especially in the areas of maritime security and counterterrorism, with Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam.

(a) United States commitment to Taiwan.—It is the policy of the United States to faithfully enforce all existing United States Government commitments to Taiwan, as enshrined in the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (Public Law 96–8) and the Six Assurances agreed to by President Ronald Reagan in July 1982.

(b) Arms sales to Taiwan.—The President shall conduct regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan that are tailored to meet the existing and likely future threats from the People’s Republic of China, including supporting the efforts of Taiwan to develop and integrate asymmetric capabilities, including undersea warfare and air defense capabilities, into its military forces.

(c) Travel.—The President shall authorize the travel of high-level United States officials to Taiwan, in accordance with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115–135).

(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has flagrantly defied the international community by illicitly developing its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), and 2397 (2017).

(2) The Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea engages in gross human rights abuses against its own people and citizens of other countries, including the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan.

(3) The United States is committed to pursuing a peaceful denuclearization of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea through a policy of maximum pressure and engagement, in close concert with its partners.

(b) Policy of the United States with respect to sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.—

(1) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to continue to impose sanctions with respect to activities of the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, persons acting for or on behalf of such government, or other persons in accordance with Executive Order 13687 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to imposing additional sanctions with respect to North Korea), Executive Order 13694 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking the property of certain persons engaging in significant malicious cyber-enabled activities), Executive Order 13722 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking the property of the Government of North Korea and the Workers’ Party of Korea, and prohibiting certain transactions with respect to North Korea), and Executive Order 13810 (82 Fed. Reg. 44705; relating to imposing additional sanctions with respect to North Korea), as such Executive orders are in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act, until the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is no longer engaged in the illicit activities described in such Executive orders, including actions in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), and 2375 (2017).

(2) REPORT.—Not later than 30 days after terminating any sanction with respect to the activities of the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, a person acting for or on behalf of such government, or any other person provided for in an Executive order listed in subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees regarding the cessation of any illicit activity that violates United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), or 2375 (2017) by such Government or person.

(3) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to limit the authority of the President pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).

(c) Policy of the United States with respect to negotiation on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs.—It is the policy of the United States that the objective of negotiations with respect to the nuclear and ballistic missile programs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea be the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of such programs.

(d) Report on a strategy To address the threats posed by, and the capabilities of, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of State, or a designee of the Secretary, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that describes actions taken by the United States to address the threats posed by, and the capabilities of, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

(2) ELEMENTS.—Each report required under paragraph (1) shall include—

(A) a summary of ongoing efforts by the United States to identify strategies and policies, including an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of such strategies and policies—

(i) to achieve peaceful de­nu­cle­a­ri­za­tion of the Korean Peninsula; and

(ii) to eliminate the threat posed by the ballistic missile program of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea;

(B) an assessment of—

(i) potential road maps toward peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the elimination of the nuclear and ballistic missile threats posed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; and

(ii) specific actions that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea would need to take for each such roadmap to become viable;

(C) a summary of the United States strategy to increase international coordination and cooperation, whether unilaterally, bilaterally, or multilaterally, including sanctions enforcement and interdiction, to address the threat posed by the nuclear and ballistic missile programs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which shall include—

(i) a description of the actions taken by the Secretary of State, or designees of the Secretary, to consult with governments around the world, with the purpose of inducing such governments to diplomatically and economically isolate the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea;

(ii) a description of the actions taken by such governments to implement measures to diplomatically and economically isolate the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea;

(iii) a list of countries with governments that the Secretary has determined are noncooperative with respect to implementing measures to diplomatically and economically isolate the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; and

(iv) a plan of action to engage, and increase cooperation with respect to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, with the governments of the countries on the list described in clause (iii); and

(D) an assessment of the adequacy of the national export control regimes of countries that are members of the United Nations, and multilateral export control regimes, that are necessary to enforce sanctions imposed with respect to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolutions; and

(E) an action plan to encourage and assist countries in adopting and using authorities necessary to enforce export controls required by United Nations Security Council resolutions.

(3) FORM OF REPORT.—Each report required under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(e) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) representatives of the United States shall use the voice and vote of the United States in all international organizations, as appropriate, to advocate for the expulsion of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from such organizations, until such time as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea meets its commitments under United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), and 2397 (2017);

(2) the Secretary of State may take such actions as are necessary to induce countries to take measures to diplomatically and economically isolate the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including—

(A) reducing the diplomatic presence in the United States of countries with governments that the Secretary has determined are noncooperative with respect to implementing measures to diplomatically and economically isolate the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; and

(B) reducing the diplomatic presence of the United States in such countries; and

(3) the Secretary of State may terminate or reduce United States foreign assistance to countries enabling the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States supports strengthening diplomatic, economic, and the security relationship with New Zealand;

(2) the United States supports strong United States engagement with the nations of the South Pacific, including Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Islands Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu;

(3) the United States recognizes the strong historical, strategic and cultural ties to these countries;

(4) the United States should deepen its cooperation with New Zealand and the nations of the South Pacific in areas of mutual interest, including—

(A) fisheries and marine resource conservation;

(B) environmental challenges and resilience;

(C) global health;

(D) development and trade; and

(E) people-to-people ties; and

(5) the United States should provide robust foreign assistance to the Pacific islands.

(a) Freedom of navigation.—It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to conduct, as part of its global Freedom of Navigation Program, regular freedom of navigation and overflight operations in the Indo-Pacific region, in accordance with applicable international law; and

(2) to promote genuine multilateral negotiations to peacefully resolve maritime disputes in the South China Sea, in accordance with applicable international law.

(b) Joint Indo-Pacific diplomatic strategy.—It is the sense of Congress that the President should develop a diplomatic strategy that includes working with United States allies and partners to conduct joint maritime training and freedom of navigation operations in the Indo-Pacific region, including the East China Sea and the South China Sea, in support of a rules-based international system benefitting all countries.

(a) Report.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and other appropriate officials, shall submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress that contains an assessment of the current and future capabilities and activities of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist groups in Southeast Asia that pose a significant threat to the United States, its allies, and its citizens interests abroad.

(b) Elements.—The report required under subsection (a) shall include—

(1) the current number of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist group-affiliated fighters in Southeast Asia;

(2) the estimated number of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist group-affiliated fighters expected to return to Southeast Asia from fighting in the Middle East;

(3) the current resources available to combat the threat of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist group-affiliated fighters in Southeast Asia, and the additional resources required to combat such threat;

(4) a detailed assessment of the capabilities of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist group-affiliated fighters to operate effectively in countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia;

(5) a description of the capabilities and resources of governments in Southeast Asia to counter violent extremist groups; and

(6) a list of additional United States resources and capabilities that the Department of Defense recommends providing to governments in Southeast Asia to combat violent extremist groups.

(c) Definitions.—In this section—

(1) the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(A) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(C) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and

(D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(2) the term “ISIS” means the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that there should be robust cybersecurity cooperation between the United States and nations in the Indo-Pacific region—

(1) to effectively respond to cybersecurity threats, including state-sponsored threats;

(2) to share best practices to combat such threats; and

(3) to strengthen resilience against misinformation and propaganda.

(b) Authorization of appropriations.—There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary—

(1) to build capacity for responding to cybersecurity threats originating in the Indo-Pacific region; and

(2) to enhance cooperation between the United States and nations in such region for combating such threats.

(a) In general.—The United States Government—

(1) recognizes that the spread of nuclear weapons, and their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security;

(2) seeks to peacefully address the unique challenge posed to regional and global stability by the illicit use, and the proliferation to and from North Korea, of sensitive nuclear and missile technologies;

(3) notes efforts by China and Russia—

(A) to expand and modernize their respective nuclear arsenals; and

(B) to pursue sales of commercial nuclear technologies; and

(4) recognizes the legitimate pursuit by many countries in the Indo-Pacific region of nuclear energy for a variety of peaceful applications.

(b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States Government should undertake all reasonable and appropriate efforts to pursue effective arms control and nuclear nonproliferation policies in the Indo-Pacific region to limit the further spread of potentially dangerous and destabilizing conventional and nuclear weapons.

(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) According to the United States Chamber of Commerce, by 2030—

(A) 66 percent of the global middle class population will be in Asia; and

(B) 59 percent of middle class consumption will be in Asia.

(2) According to the Asian Development Bank—

(A) Asian countries have signed 140 bilateral or regional trade agreements; and

(B) 75 more trade agreements with Asian countries are under negotiation or concluded and awaiting entry into force.

(3) The United States has signed free trade agreements with 3 nations in the Indo-Pacific region, namely Australia, Singapore, and the Republic of Korea.

(4) The member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (referred to in this section as “ASEAN”), as a group—

(A) represent the fifth largest economy in the world; and

(B) have a combined gross domestic product of $2,400,000,000,000.

(5) The economy comprised of ASEAN member states grew by 66 percent between 2006 and 2015, and the total value of bilateral trade between the United States and ASEAN member states has increased by 78 percent since 2004.

(6) In 2015, the trade surplus of goods sold by companies in ASEAN member states to consumers in the United States was $77,000,000,000, while the United States 2015 trade surplus of services provided to consumers in ASEAN member states was $8,000,000,000.

(7) According to U.S.-ASEAN Business Council, Inc., goods and services exported from the United States to ASEAN member states support 550,000 jobs in the United States.

(8) According to the Business Roundtable—

(A) the United States, Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam were responsible for a combined 40 percent of global gross domestic product in 2017; and

(B) United States bilateral trade with the other nations referred to in subparagraph (A) supports 15,600,000 jobs in the United States.

(9) According to the United States National Security Strategy—

(A) ASEAN and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) “remain centerpieces of the Indo-Pacific’s regional architecture and platforms for promoting an order based on freedom”; and

(B) the United States will “work with partners to build a network of states dedicated to free markets and protected from forces that would subvert their sovereignty.”.

(b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that trade between the United States and the nations in the Indo-Pacific region is vitally important to the United States economy, United States exports, and jobs in the United States.

Congress supports—

(1) multilateral, bilateral, or regional trade agreements that increase United States employment and expand the economy;

(2) formal economic dialogues that include concrete outcomes;

(3) high-standard bilateral investment treaties between the United States and nations in the Indo-Pacific region;

(4) negotiations of the Trade in Services Agreement and the Environmental Goods Agreement that include several major Asian economies; and

(5) the proactive, strategic, and continuing high-level use of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the East Asia Summit, and the Group of 20 to pursue United States economic objectives in the Indo-Pacific region.

The President, acting through the United States Trade Representative, is authorized to negotiate a comprehensive economic engagement framework with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

(a) In general.—The President is encouraged to produce a robust and comprehensive trade capacity building and trade facilitation strategy for the Indo-Pacific region.

(b) Authorization of appropriations.—There are authorized to be appropriated such amounts as may be necessary to carry out subsection (a).

(a) In general.—The President is encouraged to impose penalties on all entities found to be complicit in the theft of United States intellectual property, in accordance with applicable law, including commercial cyber-enabled theft.

(b) Annual report.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the President shall submit a report to Congress that—

(1) describes the efforts of the United States Government to combat intellectual property and commercial cyber-enabled theft in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly the People’s Republic of China; and

(2) includes a country-by-country assessment of priority areas for United States engagement and capacity building assistance.

(c) Authorization of appropriations.—There are authorized to be appropriated such amounts as may be necessary to sponsor bilateral and multilateral activities designed to build capacity in the identified priority areas described in the annual report required under subsection (b).

(a) Indo-Pacific energy strategy.—

(1) STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Energy, shall create a United States Government strategy to increase United States exports of energy to the nations in the Indo-Pacific region.

(2) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated such amounts as may be necessary to carry out paragraph (1).

(b) Reliable energy partnerships.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the President should establish bilateral and regional initiatives to increase energy security in the Indo-Pacific region;

(2) the United States should authorize the supply of liquefied natural gas to the nations in the Indo-Pacific region; and

(3) the United States should create a dedicated program, in partnership with the private sector and multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, to promote universal access to reliable electricity in Myanmar (historically known as “Burma”).

The Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, should increase regional engagement in the areas of environment, health, education, and infrastructure development with the Lower Mekong countries, including—

(1) assisting to develop programs that focus on forecasting environmental challenges and resilience;

(2) assisting with transnational cooperation on sustainable uses of forest and water resources with the goal of preserving the biodiversity of the Mekong Basin and access to safe drinking water;

(3) assisting with education enrollment and broadband internet connectivity, particularly English training and connectivity in rural communities; and

(4) improving global health in the Lower Mekong countries, including—

(A) reducing the HIV/AIDS infection rate; and

(B) helping regional partners to track and treat malaria and tuberculosis.

Congress finds that—

(1) the promotion of human rights and respect for democratic values in the Indo-Pacific region is in the United States national security interests;

(2) there are serious concerns with the rule of law and civil liberties in Cambodia, China, North Korea, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, which have all been identified by Freedom House as “Not Free”;

(3) there have been recent disturbing human rights developments in—

(A) Burma (Myanmar), which has been identified by Freedom House as “Not Free”; and

(B) the Philippines, which has been identified by Freedom House as “Partly Free”; and

(4) according to the National Security Strategy, the United States—

(A) will “support, with our words and actions, those who live under oppressive regimes and who seek freedom, individual dignity, and the rule of law”;

(B) “may use diplomacy, sanctions, and other tools to isolate states and leaders who threaten our interests and whose actions run contrary to our values”; and

(C) “will support efforts to advance women’s equality, protect the rights of women and girls, and promote women and youth empowerment programs.”.

The President is encouraged to pursue additional efforts to combat trafficking in persons and human slavery in the Indo-Pacific region.

The Secretary of State should—

(1) establish high-level bilateral and regional dialogues with nations in the Indo-Pacific region regarding human rights and religious freedom violations;

(2) establish or support robust, people-to-people exchange programs in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly programs engaging young leaders; and

(3) establish educational exchanges and capacity-building programs emphasizing civil society development.

(a) Sanctions.—The President is authorized to impose sanctions, in accordance with applicable law, including financial penalties and visa bans, on any individual or entity that—

(1) violates human rights or religious freedoms; or

(2) engages in censorship activities.

(b) Suspension of foreign assistance.—The President is authorized, in accordance with applicable law, to terminate, suspend, or otherwise alter United States economic assistance to any country that has engaged in serious violations of human rights or religious freedoms.

(a) Promotion of democracy in the Indo-Pacific region.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be appropriated $150,000,000, for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023, to promote democracy, strengthen civil society, human rights, rule of law, transparency, and accountability in the Indo-Pacific region.

(2) DEMOCRACY IN CHINA.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be made available for United States Government efforts, led by the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, to promote democracy, the rule of law, and human rights in the People’s Republic of China.

(3) TIBET.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be made available for nongovernmental organizations to support activities preserving cultural traditions and promoting sustainable development, education, and environmental conservation in Tibetan communities in the Tibet Autonomous Region and in other Tibetan communities in China, India, and Nepal.

(b) Freedom of information to North Korea.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be appropriated $10,000,000, for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023, to implement programs to enhance freedom of information efforts with regard to North Korea.

(2) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter through September 30, 2023, the Broadcasting Board of Governors shall submit a report to Congress that describes the implementation of the programs described in paragraph (1).