(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Venezuela’s electoral event on May 20, 2018, was characterized by widespread fraud and did not comply with international standards for a free, fair, and transparent electoral process.

(2) Given the fraudulent nature of Venezuela’s May 20, 2018, electoral event, Nicolás Maduro’s tenure as President of Venezuela ended on January 10, 2019.

(3) The National Assembly of Venezuela approved a resolution on January 15, 2019, that terminated Nicolás Maduro’s authority as the President of Venezuela.

(4) On January 23, 2019, the President of the National Assembly of Venezuela was sworn in as the Interim President of Venezuela.

(5) The United States Government, the Governments of Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, North Macedonia, Malta, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom, the Secretary General of the Organization of American States, and the European Parliament have all recognized National Assembly President Juan Guaidó as the Interim President of Venezuela.

(b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress—

(1) to support the decisions by the United States Government, more than 50 governments around the world, the Secretary General of the Organization of American States, and the European Parliament to recognize National Assembly President Juan Guaidó as the Interim President of Venezuela;

(2) to encourage the Interim President of Venezuela to advance efforts to hold democratic presidential elections in the shortest possible period; and

(3) that the Organization of American States, with support from the United States Government and partner governments, should provide diplomatic, technical, and financial support for a new presidential election in Venezuela that complies with international standards for a free, fair, and transparent electoral processes.

(a) Findings.—Congress finds that Venezuela’s unicameral National Assembly convened on January 6, 2016, following democratic elections that were held on December 6, 2015.

(b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) Venezuela’s democratically elected National Assembly is the only national level democratic institution remaining in the country; and

(2) actions taken by the Maduro regime that require legislative approval, ratification, or concurrence, including the provision or refinancing of debts, should only be recognized as legitimate by the United States and the international community if such legislative actions are authorized by the democratically elected National Assembly of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.

(c) Policy.—It is the policy of the United States to recognize the democratically elected National Assembly of Venezuela as the only legitimate national legislative body in Venezuela.

(d) Assistance to Venezuela’s National Assembly.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall prioritize efforts to provide technical assistance to support the democratically elected National Assembly of Venezuela in accordance with section 406.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) direct, credible negotiations led by the Interim President of Venezuela and members of Venezuela’s democratically elected National Assembly—

(A) are supported by stakeholders in the international community that have recognized the Interim President of Venezuela;

(B) include the input and interests of Venezuelan civil society; and

(C) represent the best opportunity to reach a solution to the Venezuelan crisis that includes—

(i) holding a new presidential election that complies with international standards for a free, fair, and transparent electoral process;

(ii) ending Nicolás Maduro’s usurpation of presidential authorities;

(iii) restoring democracy and the rule of law;

(iv) freeing political prisoners; and

(v) facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid;

(2) dialogue between the Maduro regime and political opposition that commenced in October 2017, and were supported by the Governments of Mexico, of Chile, of Bolivia, and of Nicaragua, did not result in an agreement because the Maduro regime failed to credibly participate in the process; and

(3) negotiations between the Maduro regime and political opposition that commenced in October 2016, and were supported by the Vatican, did not result in an agreement because the Maduro regime failed to credibly participate in the process.

(b) Policy.—It is the policy of the United States to support diplomatic engagement in order to advance a negotiated and peaceful solution to Venezuela’s political, economic, and humanitarian crisis that is described in subsection (a)(1).

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States Government should expand efforts to peacefully address Venezuela’s humanitarian crisis; and

(2) humanitarian assistance—

(A) should be provided directly to the people of Venezuela; and

(B) should not be passed through the control or distribution mechanisms of the Maduro regime.

(b) In general.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall work through international and nongovernmental organizations to provide humanitarian assistance to individuals and communities in Venezuela, including—

(1) public health commodities to Venezuelan health facilities and services, including medicines on the World Health Organization’s Model List of Essential Medicines and basic medical supplies and equipment;

(2) the basic food commodities and nutritional supplements needed to address growing malnutrition and improve food security for the people of Venezuela, with a specific emphasis on the most vulnerable populations; and

(3) technical assistance to ensure that health and food commodities are appropriately selected, procured, and distributed.

(c) Strategy requirement.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall submit a strategy for carrying out the activities described in subsection (b) to—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;

(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(D) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(2) ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under paragraph (1) shall be based on independent assessments of the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela, including assessments by nongovernmental organizations and the United Nations humanitarian agencies listed in section 204(a).

(d) Authorization of appropriations.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of State $200,000,000 for fiscal year 2019 to carry out the activities set forth in subsection (b) in accordance with this section.

(2) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided under subparagraph (B), amounts appropriated or otherwise made available pursuant to paragraph (1) may not be obligated until 15 days after the date on which the President provides notice to the committees listed in subsection (c)(1) of the intent to obligate such funds.

(B) WAIVER.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State may waive the requirement under subparagraph (A) if the Secretary of State determines that such requirement would pose a substantial risk to human health or welfare.

(ii) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.—If a waiver is invoked under clause (i), the President shall notify the committees listed in subsection (c)(1) of the intention to obligate funds under this section as early as practicable, but not later than 3 days after taking the action to which such notification requirement was applicable in the context of the circumstances necessitating such waiver.

(a) In general.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall work through international and nongovernmental organizations to provide Venezuelans in neighboring countries with humanitarian aid, such as—

(1) urgently needed health and nutritional assistance, including logistical and technical assistance to hospitals and health centers in affected communities;

(2) food assistance for vulnerable individuals, including assistance to improve food security for affected communities; and

(3) hygiene supplies and sanitation services.

(b) Additional elements.—The assistance described in subsection (a)—

(1) may be provided—

(A) directly to Venezuelans in neighboring countries; or

(B) indirectly through the communities in which the Venezuelans reside; and

(2) should focus on the most vulnerable Venezuelans in neighboring countries.

(c) Strategy requirement.—The strategy required under section 201(c) shall include a strategy for carrying out the activities described in subsection (a).

(d) Authorization of appropriations.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of State $200,000,000 for fiscal year 2019 to carry out the activities set forth in subsection (a) in accordance with this section.

(2) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided under subparagraph (B), amounts appropriated or otherwise made available pursuant to paragraph (1) may not be obligated until 15 days after the date on which the President provides notice to the committees listed in section 201(c)(1) of the intent to obligate such funds.

(B) WAIVER.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State may waive the requirement under subparagraph (A) if the Secretary determines that such requirement would pose a substantial risk to human health or welfare.

(ii) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.—If a waiver is invoked under clause (i), the President shall notify the committees listed in section 201(c)(1) of the intention to obligate funds under this section as early as practicable, but not later than 3 days after taking the action to which such notification requirement was applicable in the context of the circumstances necessitating such waiver.

(a) Strategy.—The strategy required under section 201(c) shall include a multiyear strategy that—

(1) describes United States diplomatic efforts to ensure support from international donors, including regional partners in Latin America and the Caribbean, for the provision of humanitarian assistance to the people of Venezuela;

(2) identifies governments that are willing to provide financial and technical assistance for the provision of such humanitarian assistance to the people of Venezuela and a description of such assistance; and

(3) identifies the financial and technical assistance to be provided by multilateral institutions, including the United Nations humanitarian agencies listed in section 104(a), the Pan American Health Organization, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the World Bank, and a description of such assistance.

(b) Diplomatic engagement.—The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall work with relevant foreign governments and multilateral organizations to coordinate a donors summit and carry out diplomatic engagement to advance the strategy described in subsection (a).

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the United Nations humanitarian agencies, including the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the World Health Organization, the Pan American Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, UNICEF, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, should conduct and publish independent assessments regarding—

(1) the extent and impact of the shortages of food, medicine, and medical supplies in Venezuela;

(2) basic health indicators in Venezuela, such as maternal and child mortality rates and the prevalence and treatment of communicable diseases; and

(3) the efforts needed to resolve the shortages identified in paragraph (1) and to improve the health indicators referred to in paragraph (2).

(b) Initial efforts.—The President shall instruct the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations to use the voice and vote of the United States in the United Nations Security Council to secure the necessary votes—

(1) to place the humanitarian and political crisis in Venezuela on the United Nations Security Council’s Programme of Work; and

(2) to secure a Presidential Statement from the President of the United Nations Security Council urging the Maduro regime—

(A) to allow the delivery of humanitarian relief; and

(B) to lift bureaucratic impediments or any other obstacles preventing independent nongovernmental organizations from providing the proper assistance to the people of Venezuela without any interference by the Maduro regime.

(c) United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator.—The President shall instruct the Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the voice and influence of the United States to advance the appointment of a United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for Venezuela to lead and coordinate the efforts of humanitarian organizations in a manner that contributes to Venezuela’s long-term recovery.

(d) Additional efforts.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—If the Maduro regime refuses to allow the delivery of humanitarian relief and to lift bureaucratic impediments and any other obstacles described in subsection (b)(2)(B), the President, beginning not later than 30 days after the conclusion of the efforts of the United Nations described in such subsection, shall instruct the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations to use the voice and vote of the United States to secure the adoption of a resolution described in paragraph (2).

(2) RESOLUTION DESCRIBED.—The resolution described in this paragraph is a Resolution of the United Nations Security Council that—

(A) requires the Maduro regime to promptly allow safe and unhindered access for humanitarian agencies and their implementing partners, including possible support from neighboring countries; and

(B) calls on the Maduro regime—

(i) to allow the delivery of food and medicine to the people of Venezuela;

(ii) to end human rights violations against the people of Venezuela;

(iii) to agree to free, fair, and transparent elections with credible international observers;

(iv) to cease violence against the people of Venezuela; and

(v) to release all political prisoners held by the Maduro regime.

(a) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY.—The term “agricultural commodity” has the meaning given that term in section 102 of the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 5602).

(2) MEDICAL DEVICE.—The term “medical device” has the meaning given the term “device” in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).

(3) MEDICINE.—The term “medicine” has the meaning given the term “drug” in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).

(b) In general.—Any transaction for the sale of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical devices to Venezuela or for the provision of humanitarian assistance to the people of Venezuela, and any transaction that is incidental or necessary to any such transaction, regardless of whether the transactions or provision of humanitarian assistance originate in, or have a connection to, the United States, shall be exempt from United States sanctions, including sanctions described in—

(1) sections 603, 605, 606, 608, and 701;

(2) the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014 (Public Law 113–278); or

(3) Executive Orders 13692, 13808, 13827, 13835, 13850, and 13857.

(a) Reporting requirement.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, acting through the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit a classified report to the appropriate congressional committees that assesses the declining cohesion inside the Venezuelan military and security forces and the Maduro regime.

(b) Additional elements.—The report submitted under subsection (a) shall—

(1) identify senior members of the Venezuelan military and the Maduro regime, including generals, admirals, cabinet ministers, deputy cabinet ministers, and the heads of intelligence agencies, whose loyalty to Nicolás Maduro is declining;

(2) describe the factors that would accelerate the decision making of individuals identified in paragraph (1)—

(A) to break with the Maduro regime; and

(B) to recognize the Interim President of Venezuela and his government; and

(3) assess and detail the massive number of desertions and defections that have occurred at the officer and enlisted levels inside the Venezuelan military and security forces.

(c) Appropriate congressional committees.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;

(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(4) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(a) In general.—The Secretary of State shall impose the visa restrictions described in subsection (c) on any current or former official of the Maduro regime, or any foreign person acting on behalf of such regime, who the Secretary determines—

(1) is responsible for, is complicit in, is responsible for ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, or is knowingly participating in (directly or indirectly) any activity in or in relation to Venezuela, on or after January 23, 2019, that undermines or threatens the integrity of—

(A) the democratically elected National Assembly of Venezuela; or

(B) the President of such National Assembly, while serving as Interim President of Venezuela, or the government officials under the supervision of such President;

(2) is the spouse or child of a foreign person described in paragraph (1); or

(3) is the spouse or child of a foreign person described or identified under—

(A) section 5(a) of the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014 (Public Law 113–278), as amended by section 603 of this Act;

(B) section 804(b) of the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (21 U.S.C. 1903(b)); or

(C) Executive Orders 13692 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) and 13850.

(b) Removal from visa revocation list.—If a person described in subsection (a)(1) or in subparagraphs (A) through (C) of subsection (a)(3) publicly recognizes and pledges supports for the Interim President of Venezuela and the government officials supervised by such Interim President, any family members of such person who were subject to visa restrictions pursuant to paragraph (2) or (3) of such subsection shall no longer be subject to such visa restrictions.

(c) Visa restrictions described.—

(1) EXCLUSION FROM THE UNITED STATES AND REVOCATION OF VISA OR OTHER DOCUMENTATION.—Subject to paragraph (2) and subsection (b), an alien described in subsection (a)—

(A) is inadmissible to the United States;

(B) is ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation authorizing entry into the United States;

(C) is otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.); and

(D) shall, in accordance with section 221(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1201(i)), have his or her visa or other documentation revoked, regardless of when the visa or other documentation was issued.

(2) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT.—Sanctions under paragraph (1) shall not apply to an alien if admitting the alien into the United States is necessary to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States, or other applicable international obligations.

(d) Rulemaking.—The President shall issue such regulations, licenses, and orders as may be necessary to carry out this section.

(a) Removal from visa revocation list.—If a person sanctioned under any of the provisions of law described in subsection (b) publicly recognizes and pledges supports for the Interim President of Venezuela and the government officials supervised by such Interim President, the person shall no longer be subject to such sanctions.

(b) Sanctions described.—The sanctions described in this subsection are set forth in the following provisions of law:

(1) (A) Paragraphs (3) and (4) of section 5(a) of the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014 (Public Law 113–278), as amended by section 603 of this Act.

(B) Paragraph (5) of section 5(a) of such Act, to the extent such paragraph relates to the sanctions described in paragraph (3) or (4) of such subsection.

(2) (A) Clauses (1) and (4) of section 1(a)(ii)(A) of Executive Order 13692 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note).

(B) Subparagraph (D)(2) of section 1(a)(ii) of such Executive Order, to the extent such subparagraph relates to the provisions of law cited in subparagraph (A).

(3) (A) Section 1(a)(ii) of Executive Order 13850.

(B) Paragraph (iii) of section 1(a) of such Executive Order, to the extent such paragraph relates to the provision of law cited in subparagraph (A).

(c) Rulemaking.—The President shall issue such regulations, licenses, and orders as may be necessary to carry out this section.

(a) Designation.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall designate a Special Envoy for Venezuela (referred to in this section as the “Special Envoy”), who shall—

(1) have the rank and status of ambassador; and

(2) report directly to the Secretary of State.

(b) Duties.—The Special Envoy shall—

(1) coordinate United States policy towards Venezuela between relevant departments and agencies, including the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Justice, the Department of Defense, the United States Agency for International Development, and the intelligence community;

(2) develop and conduct oversight of United States programs and operations related to Venezuela, including humanitarian assistance, support for regional migration systems, and assistance to democratic actors and independent civil society in Venezuela;

(3) advance efforts—

(A) to recover the assets described in section 502(a)(2) that were stolen from the Venezuelan people; and

(B) to coordinate sanctions with the United States partners referred to in section 601;

(4) engage and coordinate policy matters related to Venezuela with the international community, including the Organization of American States, the United Nations and its agencies, the Lima Group, the European Union, and other governments and organizations with interest in Venezuela;

(5) engage and coordinate with actors supporting the restoration of democracy in Venezuela, including the Venezuelan diaspora and the democratic political opposition in Venezuela; and

(6) communicate and coordinate engagement with the Maduro regime.

(c) Authorization.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Special Envoy is authorized to directly engage with the Maduro regime and its officers.

(d) Task Force on Venezuela.—

(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established an interagency task force, to be known as the “Task Force on Venezuela” (referred to in this subsection as the “Task Force”.

(2) MISSION.—The primary mission of the Task Force is to support the Special Envoy in the exercise of the duties described in subsection (b).

(3) COMPOSITION.—The Task Force shall include representatives of, or liaison officers from, the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Justice, the Department of Defense, the United States Agency for International Development, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Members of the Task Force shall be selected from among existing employees of their respective departments.

(e) Monthly consultation.—Not later than 30 days after being designated under subsection (a), and every 30 days thereafter, the Special Envoy shall brief and consult with—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(2) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;

(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(4) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The Lima Group is a diplomatic bloc whose members include Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Saint Lucia.

(2) The Lima Group—

(A) has recognized National Assembly President Juan Guaidó as the Interim President of Venezuela;

(B) has reaffirmed the authority of the democratically elected National Assembly of Venezuela;

(C) has stated that it does not recognize the legitimacy of Nicolás Maduro’s tenure in office beyond January 10, 2019;

(D) has stated that it does not recognize the legitimacy of Venezuela’s May 20, 2018, presidential election as it did not comply with international standards for a democratic, free, fair, and transparent process;

(E) has called on Nicolás Maduro to provisionally transfer executive powers to the National Assembly of Venezuela until new democratic elections are held;

(F) has condemned the rupture of the democratic order in Venezuela;

(G) has called on the Maduro regime to accept humanitarian assistance in order to address the country’s growing economic crisis; and

(H) reiterated its “conviction that the transition to democracy must be conducted by Venezuelans themselves, peacefully and within the framework of the Constitution and international law, supported by political and diplomatic means, without the use of force.”.

(b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of State should conduct diplomatic engagement in support of efforts by the Lima Group to restore democracy and the rule of law in Venezuela and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance for the Venezuelan people.

(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) On July 25, 2017, the Secretary General of the Organization of American States stated “the systematic attack against the civilian population [of Venezuela] includes murders, imprisonment and torture, and it is evident in the eyes of the international community that we are in the presence of crimes against humanity.”.

(2) On September 11, 2017, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights stated that Venezuelan security forces may have committed crimes against humanity against protesters and called for a credible international investigation.

(3) A November 29, 2017, report by Human Rights Watch documented that Venezuelan security forces had used extreme and, at times, lethal forces against protesters and, once detained, subjected them to abuses ranging from severe beatings to torture involving electric shocks, asphyxiation, and other techniques.

(4) On February 8, 2018, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court opened a preliminary examination of the situation in Venezuela as it relates to Venezuelan security forces using excessive force against civilians and the political opposition.

(5) On May 29, 2018, a panel of independent international experts convened by the Secretary General of the Organization of American States found that “there are reasonable grounds that satisfy the standard of proof required by Article 53 of the Rome Statute for considering that acts to which the civilian population of Venezuela was subjected … constitute crimes against humanity”.

(b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of State should conduct robust diplomatic engagement in support of efforts in Venezuela, and on the part of the international community, to ensure accountability for possible crimes against humanity and other violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of human rights.

(c) Report.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to Congress that—

(1) evaluates the degree to which the Maduro regime and its officials, including members of the Venezuelan security force, have engaged in actions that constitute crimes against humanity and violations of internationally recognized humanitarian rights; and

(2) provides options for holding accountable the perpetrators identified under paragraph (1).

(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Article 1 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which was adopted by the Organization of American States in Lima on September 11, 2001, states: “The peoples of the Americas have a right to democracy and their governments have an obligation to promote and defend it.”.

(2) Article 19 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter states “an unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order or an unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime that seriously impairs the democratic order in a member state, constitutes, while it persists, an insurmountable obstacle to its government’s participation in sessions of the General Assembly … and other bodies of the Organization.”.

(3) Article 20 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter states the following:

(A) “In the event of an unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime that seriously impairs the democratic order in a member state, any member state or the Secretary General may request the immediate convocation of the Permanent Council to undertake a collective assessment of the situation and to take such decisions as it deems appropriate.”.

(B) “The Permanent Council, depending on the situation, may undertake the necessary diplomatic initiatives, including good offices, to foster the restoration of democracy.”.

(4) Article 21 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter states “When the special session of the General Assembly determines that there has been an unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order of a member state, and that diplomatic initiatives have failed, the special session shall take the decision to suspend said member state.”.

(b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) Nicolás Maduro and the Supreme Tribunal of Justice of Venezuela have carried out systematic efforts to undermine, block, and circumvent the authorities and responsibilities of the Venezuelan National Assembly, as mandated in the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela;

(2) the electoral process convened by the National Electoral Council of Venezuela on May 20, 2018 was not democratic, free, fair, or transparent;

(3) Nicolás Maduro’s attempt to inaugurate himself for a second term in office on January 10, 2019, was not legitimate;

(4) such events constitute an unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime that seriously impairs the democratic order in Venezuela; and

(5) the Secretary of State, working through the United States Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States, should take additional steps to support ongoing efforts by the Secretary General—

(A) to invoke the Inter-American Democratic Charter; and

(B) to promote diplomatic initiatives to foster the restoration of Venezuelan democracy.

(a) In general.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development—

(1) shall work with the Organization of American States to ensure credible international observation of future elections in Venezuela that contributes to free, fair, and transparent democratic electoral processes; and

(2) shall work through nongovernmental organizations—

(A) to strengthen democratic governance and institutions, including the democratically elected National Assembly of Venezuela;

(B) to defend internationally recognized human rights for the people of Venezuela, including support for efforts to document crimes against humanity and violations of human rights;

(C) to support the efforts of independent media outlets to broadcast, distribute, and share information beyond the limited channels made available by the Maduro regime; and

(D) to combat corruption and improve the transparency and accountability of institutions that are part of the Maduro regime.

(b) Voice and vote at the Organization of American States.—The Secretary of State, acting through the United States Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States, should advocate and build diplomatic support for sending an election observation mission to Venezuela to ensure that democratic electoral processes are organized and carried out in a free, fair, and transparent manner.

(c) Strategy requirement.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall submit a strategy to carry out the activities described in subsection (a) to—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(2) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;

(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(4) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(d) Authorization of appropriations.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of State for fiscal year 2019—

(A) $500,000 to carry out the activities described in subsection (a)(1); and

(B) $14,500,000 to carry out the activities described in subsection (a)(2).

(2) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided under subparagraph (B), amounts appropriated or otherwise made available pursuant to paragraph (1) may not be obligated until 15 days after the date on which the President provides notice to the committees listed in subsection (c) of intent to obligate such funds.

(B) WAIVER.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State may waive the notification requirement under subparagraph (A) if the Secretary determines that such waiver is in the national security interest of the United States.

(ii) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.—If a waiver is invoked under clause (i), the Secretary of State shall notify the committees listed in subsection (c) of the intention to obligate funds under this section as early as practicable, but not later than 3 days after taking the action to which such notification requirement was applicable in the context of the circumstances necessitating such waiver.

(a) In general.—The President shall engage the International Monetary Fund and the Multilateral Development Banks to create a framework for the economic reconstruction of Venezuela, contingent upon the restoration of democracy and the rule of law in the country.

(b) Additional elements.—The framework created under subsection (a) should include policy proposals—

(1) to provide Venezuelans with humanitarian assistance, poverty alleviation, and a social safety net;

(2) to advance debt restructuring and debt sustainability measures;

(3) to restore the production and efficient management of Venezuela’s oil industry, including rebuilding energy infrastructure;

(4) to eliminate price controls and market distorting subsidies in the Venezuelan economy; and

(5) to address hyperinflation in Venezuela.

(c) Consultation.—In creating the framework under subsection (a), the President shall consult with relevant stakeholders in the humanitarian (including international and nongovernmental organizations), financial, and energy sectors.

(d) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that any effort to conduct debt restructuring should—

(1) include discussions with China, which is Venezuela’s biggest creditor; and

(2) appropriately account for China’s and Russia’s high-risk lending to Venezuela.

(e) Certification.—The President may not support lending or financing for Venezuela from the International Monetary Fund and the Multilateral Development Banks until the Secretary of State submits a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives certifying that any such lending or financing—

(1) would be managed by the Interim President of Venezuela or a new, democratically elected President;

(2) would not be used to repay external creditors who are not members of the Group of Seven unless such payments are essential to the restoration of economic stability and democracy in Venezuela; and

(3) would not benefit the Maduro regime.

(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Venezuela ranked 169th out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index 2017.

(2) In March 2015, the Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network determined that approximately $2,000,000,000 had been siphoned from Venezuela’s public oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A., in conjunction with its designation of the Banca Privada d’Andorra as a Foreign Financial Institution of Primary Money Laundering Concern.

(b) In general.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, shall advance a coordinated international effort—

(1) to carry out special financial investigations to identify and track assets taken from the people and institutions of Venezuela through theft, corruption, money laundering, or other illicit means; and

(2) work with foreign governments—

(A) to share financial investigations intelligence, as appropriate;

(B) to block the assets identified pursuant to paragraph (1); and

(C) to advance necessary civil forfeiture litigation, including providing technical assistance to help governments establish the necessary legal framework to carry out asset forfeitures.

(c) Additional elements.—The coordinated international effort described in subsection (b) shall—

(1) include input from—

(A) the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury;

(B) the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network of the Department of the Treasury; and

(C) the Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section of the Department of Justice;

(2) identify appropriate steps to advance necessary civil forfeiture litigation in the United States;

(3) include an assessment of whether the United States or another member of the international community should establish a managed fund to hold the assets identified pursuant to subsection (b)(1) that could be returned to a future democratic government in Venezuela; and

(4) include recommendations for new legislative and regulatory measures in the United States that would be needed to establish and manage the fund described in paragraph (3).

(d) Strategy requirement.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a strategy for carrying out the activities described in subsection (b) to—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(2) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate;

(3) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate;

(4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;

(5) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives; and

(6) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives.

(a) Strengthening sanctions capacity in Latin America and the Caribbean.—The Secretary of State, working through the Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs, and in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall provide technical assistance to partner governments in Latin America and the Caribbean to assist such governments in establishing the legislative and regulatory frameworks needed to impose targeted sanctions on officials of the Maduro regime who—

(1) are responsible for human rights abuses;

(2) have engaged in public corruption; or

(3) are undermining democratic institutions and processes in Venezuela.

(b) Coordinating international sanctions.—The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall engage in diplomatic efforts with partner governments, including the Government of Canada, governments in the European Union, and governments in Latin America and the Caribbean, to impose targeted sanctions on the officials described in subsection (a).

(c) Strategy requirement.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit a strategy for carrying out the activities described in subsection (a) to—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(2) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;

(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(4) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(d) Authorization of appropriations.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be appropriated, to the Department of State, $3,000,000 for fiscal year 2019 to carry out the activities set forth in subsection (a) in accordance with this section.

(2) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided under subparagraph (B), amounts appropriated or otherwise made available pursuant to paragraph (1) may not be obligated until 15 days after the date on which the President provides notice to the committees listed in subsection (c) of the intent to obligate such funds.

(B) WAIVER.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State may waive the requirement under subparagraph (A) if the Secretary of State determines that such waiver is in the national security interest of the United States.

(ii) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.—If a waiver is invoked under clause (i), the President shall notify the committees listed in subsection (c) of the intention to obligate funds under this section as early as practicable, but not later than 3 days after taking the action to which such notification requirement was applicable in the context of the circumstances necessitating such waiver.

(a) Briefing requirement.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, acting through the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall brief the appropriate congressional committees on the involvement of senior officials of the Maduro regime, including members of the National Electoral Council, the judicial system, and the Venezuelan security forces, in illicit narcotics trafficking and acts of corruption in Venezuela.

(b) Additional elements.—The briefing provided under subsection (a) shall—

(1) describe how the acts of corruption described in the report pose challenges for United States national security and impact the rule of law and democratic governance in countries of the Western Hemisphere;

(2) identify individuals that frustrate the ability of the United States to combat illicit narcotics trafficking;

(3) include an assessment of the relationship between individuals identified under subsection (a) and Nicolás Maduro or members of his cabinet; and

(4) include input from the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Office of Foreign Assets Control, and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.

(c) Appropriate congressional committees.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;

(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(4) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(a) Finding.—Executive Order 13692 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note), which was signed on March 8, 2015, established sanctions against individuals responsible for undermining democratic processes and institutions and involved in acts of public corruption that were not included in the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014 (Public Law 113–278).

(b) Sanctions.—Section 5(a) of the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014 (Public Law 113–278) is amended—

(1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1)—

(A) by striking “Government of Venezuela” and inserting “Maduro regime (as defined in section 4 of the Venezuela Emergency Relief, Democracy Assistance, and Development Act of 2019)”; and

(B) by striking “that Government” and inserting “that regime”;

(2) in paragraph (2), by striking “or” at the end;

(3) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (5);

(4) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:

“(3) is responsible for, or complicit in, ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, significant actions or policies that undermine democratic processes or institutions;

“(4) is a government official, or a senior associate of such an official, that is responsible for, or complicit in, ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, acts of significant corruption, including the expropriation of private or public assets for personal gain, corruption related to government contracts or the extraction of natural resources, bribery, or the facilitation or transfer of the proceeds of corruption to foreign jurisdictions; or”; and

(5) in paragraph (5), as redesignated, by striking “paragraph (1) or (2)” and inserting “paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4)”.

(a) In general.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, except as provided in subsection (c), the Secretary of Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit a report to Congress that describes the total assessed value of blocked assets of Venezuelans designated under sanctions authorized under—

(1) the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (title VIII of Public Law 106–120; 21 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.);

(2) the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014 (Public Law 113–278), as amended by section 603 of this Act; or

(3) Executive Orders 13692 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) and 13850.

(b) Additional elements.—Reports submitted under subsection (a) should provide descriptions of specific cases that are most representative of the endemic corruption and illicit financial activities occurring in Venezuela.

(c) Subsequent reports.—The Secretary of Treasury is not required to submit an updated report to Congress under subsection (a) unless, since the submission of the preceding report—

(1) there has been meaningful change in the value of blocked assets; or

(2) additional individuals have been targeted for sanctions under the authorities listed in subsection (a).

(d) Briefings.—If the Secretary of Treasury exercises the exception described in subsection (c), the Secretary of the Treasury, or designee, shall immediately brief Congress regarding—

(1) the decision to exercise the exception; and

(2) information related to the value of blocked assets described in subsection (a).

(e) Form.—Reports required under this section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(a) Finding.—Executive Order 13808 (82 Fed. Reg. 41155), which was signed on August 24, 2017, established sanctions against the Maduro regime’s ability to issue public debt.

(b) Definitions.—In this section and in sections 606 and 608:

(1) ENTITY.—The term “entity” means a partnership, association, trust, joint venture, corporation, group, subgroup, or other organization.

(2) PERSON.—The term “person” means an individual or entity.

(3) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term “United States person” means any—

(A) United States citizen;

(B) alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States;

(C) entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States (including a foreign branch of any such entity); and

(D) any person physically located in the United States.

(c) In general.—The President may prohibit, in the United States or by a United States person—

(1) any transaction related to, provision of financing for, or other dealing in—

(A) debt instruments with a maturity of greater than 90 days issued by Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A., on or after the date of the enactment of this Act;

(B) debt instruments with a maturity of greater than 30 days or equity issued by the Maduro regime on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, excluding debt instruments issued by Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A., that are not covered under subparagraph (A);

(C) bonds issued by the Maduro regime before the date of the enactment of this Act; or

(D) dividend payments or other distributions of profits to the Maduro regime from any entity owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the Maduro regime;

(2) the direct or indirect purchase of securities from the Maduro regime, except for—

(A) securities qualifying as debt instruments issued by Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A., on or after the date of the enactment of this Act that are not described in paragraph (1)(A); and

(B) securities qualifying as debt instruments issued by the Maduro regime on or after the date of the enactment of this Act that are not described in paragraph (1)(B);

(3) any transaction that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate a prohibition under paragraph (1) or (2); and

(4) any conspiracy to violate a prohibition under paragraph (1), (2), or (3).

(d) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the President should waive the prohibitions described in subsection (c) and in Executive Order 13808 if the related debt instruments, bonds, or securities have been approved or ratified by the democratically elected National Assembly of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.

(e) Implementation; penalties.—

(1) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may exercise all authorities described in sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this section.

(2) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of this section or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out this section shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of that section.

(a) Finding.—Executive Order 13835 (83 Fed. Reg. 24001), which was signed on May 21, 2018, established additional sanctions against transactions involving the Maduro regime’s existing public debt.

(b) Prohibition.—The President may prohibit a United States person or any person within the United States from—

(1) purchasing any debt owed to the Maduro regime, including accounts receivable;

(2) entering into any transaction related to any debt owed to the Maduro regime that is pledged as collateral after May 21, 2018, including accounts receivable; or

(3) entering into any transaction involving the selling, transferring, assigning, or pledging as collateral by the Maduro regime of any equity interest in any entity in which the Maduro regime has a 50 percent or greater ownership interest.

(c) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the President should waive the prohibitions described in subsection (a) and in Executive Order 13835 if transactions involving related debt instruments, bonds, or securities have been approved or ratified by the democratically elected National Assembly of Venezuela.

(d) Enforcement.—The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, may promulgate such regulations as may be necessary to enforce the prohibition set forth in subsection (b).

(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) On February 13, 2017, the Department of the Treasury designated Venezuelan nationals Tareck El Aissami (the current Vice President of Venezuela) and Samark López Bello pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (21 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.).

(2) On May 7, 2018, the Department of the Treasury designated Venezuelan nationals Pedro Luis Martin, Walter Alexander del Nogal, and Mario Antonio Rodríguez pursuant to such Act.

(b) Financial sanctions expansion.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall expand investigations, intelligence collection, and analysis pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (21 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) to facilitate the identification and support the application of sanctions against—

(A) significant foreign narcotics traffickers, their organizations and networks; and

(B) the foreign persons who provide material, financial, or technological support to such traffickers, organizations, and networks.

(2) TARGETS.—The efforts described in paragraph (1) shall specifically target—

(A) senior members of the Maduro regime, including military officers, involved in narcotics trafficking and money laundering;

(B) foreign narcotics traffickers and their organizations and networks that are operating in Venezuela; and

(C) the foreign persons who provide material, financial, or technological support to such traffickers, organizations, and networks that are operating in Venezuela.

(a) Finding.—Executive Order 13850, which was signed on November 1, 2018, established sanctions against the gold sector of the Venezuelan economy.

(b) Sanctions authorized.—The President, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State, may block and prohibit the transfer, payment, exportation, withdrawal, or other disposition of all property and interests in property of any person that operates in the gold sector of the Venezuelan economy if such property is in the United States, comes into the United States, or is or comes within the possession or control of any United States person.

(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) In late 2016, Venezuelan state-owned oil company Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (referred to in this section as “PDVSA”), through a no compete transaction, secured a loan from Russian government-controlled oil company Rosneft, using 49.9 percent of PDVSA’s American subsidiary, CITGO Petroleum Corporation, including its assets in the United States, as collateral. As a result of this transaction, 100 percent of CITGO is held as collateral by PDVSA’s creditors.

(2) CITGO, a wholly owned subsidiary of PDVSA, is engaged in interstate commerce and owns and controls critical energy infrastructure in 19 States of the United States, including an extensive network of pipelines, 48 terminals, and 3 refineries, with a combined oil refining capacity of 749,000 barrels per day. CITGO’s refinery in Lake Charles, Louisiana, is the sixth largest refinery in the United States.

(3) The Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on Rosneft, which is controlled by the Government of the Russian Federation, and its Executive Chairman, Igor Sechin, following Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine and its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014.

(4) The Department of Homeland Security has designated the energy sector as critical to United States infrastructure.

(5) The growing economic crisis in Venezuela raises the probability that the Maduro regime and PDVSA will default on their international debt obligations, resulting in a scenario in which Rosneft could come into control of CITGO’s United States energy infrastructure holdings.

(b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) control of critical United States energy infrastructure by Rosneft, a Russian government-controlled entity currently under United States sanctions that is led by Igor Sechin, who is also under United States sanctions and is a close associate of Vladimir Putin, would pose a significant risk to United States national security and energy security; and

(2) a default by PDVSA on its loan from Rosneft, resulting in Rosneft coming into possession of PDVSA’s United States CITGO assets, would warrant careful consideration by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States.

(c) Preventing Rosneft from controlling United States energy infrastructure.—The President shall take all necessary steps to prevent Rosneft from gaining control of critical United States energy infrastructure.

(d) Security risk assessment.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall conduct an assessment of the security risks posed by Russian control of CITGO’s United States energy infrastructure holdings.

(2) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives that contains the results of the assessment conducted pursuant to paragraph (1).

(e) Review of CITGO transactions.—If PDVSA defaults on its debt obligations, the Secretary of the Treasury should review CITGO’s transactions with United States persons to assess and ensure compliance with United States sanctions policies and regulations.

(a) In general.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, acting through the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, and in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall brief the appropriate congressional committees on—

(1) the full extent of cooperation by the Government of the Russian Federation, the Government of the People’s Republic of China, the Government of Cuba, and the Government of Iran with the Maduro regime; and

(2) the activities inside Venezuelan territory of foreign armed groups, including Colombian criminal organizations and defectors from the Colombian guerilla group known as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, and foreign terrorist organizations, including the Colombian guerilla group known as the National Liberation Army (ELN).

(b) Appropriate congressional committees.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;

(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(4) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(a) Finding.—Executive Order 13827 (83 Fed. Reg. 12469), which was signed on March 19, 2018, established sanctions against the Maduro regime’s ability to issue a digital currency in an effort to circumvent United States sanctions.

(b) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) ENTITY.—The term “entity” means a partnership, association, trust, joint venture, corporation, group, subgroup, or other organization.

(2) PERSON.—The term “person” means an individual or entity.

(3) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term “United States person” means any—

(A) United States citizen;

(B) alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States;

(C) entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States (including a foreign branch of any such entity); and

(D) any person physically located in the United States.

(c) Prohibition of certain transactions.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—All transactions by a United States person or within the United States that relate to, provide financing for, provide software for, or otherwise deal in any digital currency, digital coin, or digital token, that was issued by, for, or on behalf of the Maduro regime are prohibited beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.

(2) APPLICABILITY.—The prohibitions under paragraph (1) shall apply to the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this Act, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted before the date of the enactment of this Act.

(3) PROHIBITIONS.—Any transaction that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this subsection is prohibited. Any conspiracy formed to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this subsection is prohibited.

(d) Rulemaking.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is authorized to take such actions, including promulgating rules and regulations, to implement this section.

(2) DELEGATION.—The Secretary of the Treasury may redelegate any of the functions described in paragraph (1) to other officers and executive departments and agencies of the United States Government. All agencies of the United States Government shall take all appropriate measures within their authority to carry out the provisions of this section.

(a) Defined term.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(2) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate;

(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(4) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives.

(b) Reporting requirement.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, after consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that provides an assessment on how digital currencies affect the effectiveness of United States sanctions around the world.

(c) Additional elements.—The report submitted under subsection (b) shall—

(1) describe any global efforts, including efforts by states, state-sponsored actors, and non-state-sponsored actors, to utilize digital currencies to evade or circumvent United States sanctions, including through the direct or indirect use of products or services of United States based technology, software, or financial services firms; and

(2) include recommendations for new legislative and regulatory measures needed to strengthen the United States Government’s ability to prevent states, state-sponsored actors, and non-state-sponsored actors from using digital currencies to evade or circumvent United States sanctions, including through the direct or indirect use of products or services of United States based technology, software, or financial services firms.

(d) Form.—The report submitted under subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(a) Humanitarian assistance; sanctioned coordination.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 15 days after any congressional committee listed under paragraph (2) requests a briefing regarding the implementation of section 201, 202, 203, or 601, the Secretary of State and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall provide such briefing to such committee.

(2) CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The committees listed under this paragraph are—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;

(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(D) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(b) United Nations; negotiated solution; crimes against humanity.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 15 days after any congressional committee listed under paragraph (2) requests a briefing regarding the implementation of section 103, 204, or 403, the Secretary of State shall provide such briefing to such committee.

(2) CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The congressional committees listed under this paragraph are—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(c) Regime cohesion; corruption and narcotics trafficking; foreign government activities.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 15 days after a congressional committee listed under paragraph (2) requests a briefing regarding the implementation of section 301, 602, or 610, the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence shall provide such briefing to such committee.

(2) CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The congressional committees listed under this paragraph are—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(B) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;

(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(D) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(d) International election observation.—Not later than 15 days after a congressional committee listed under subsection (a)(2) requests a briefing regarding the implementation of section 405, the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and the United States Ambassador to the Organization of American States shall provide such briefing to such committee.

(e) Visa restrictions; sanctions waiver.—Not later than 15 days after a congressional committee listed under subsection (b)(2) requests a briefing regarding the implementation of section 302 or 303, the Secretary of State shall provide such briefing to such committee.

(f) Reconstruction of Venezuela's energy infrastructure.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 15 days after a congressional committee listed under paragraph (2) requests a briefing regarding the implementation of section 501, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Energy, and the Secretary of the Treasury shall provide such briefing to such committee.

(2) CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The congressional committees listed under this paragraph are—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(B) the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate;

(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(D) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives.

(g) Recovery of stolen assets.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 15 days after a congressional committee listed under paragraph (2) requests a briefing regarding the implementation of section 502, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Attorney General shall provide such briefing to such committee.

(2) CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The congressional committees listed under this paragraph are—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(B) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate;

(C) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate;

(D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;

(E) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives; and

(F) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives.

(h) Financial sanctions.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 15 days after a congressional committee listed under paragraph (2) requests a briefing regarding the implementation of section 605, 606, or 608, the Secretary of the Treasury shall provide such briefing to such committee.

(2) CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The congressional committees listed under this paragraph are—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(B) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate;

(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(D) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives.

(i) Kingpin sanctions.—Not later than 15 days after a congressional committee listed under subsection (h)(2) requests a briefing regarding the implementation of section 607, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Secretary of State, and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall provide such briefing to such committee.

(j) PDVSA transactions with Rosneft.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 15 days after a congressional committee listed under paragraph (2) requests a briefing regarding the implementation of section 609, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall provide such briefing to such committee.

(2) CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The congressional committees listed under this paragraph are—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(B) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate;

(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(D) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives.

(k) Cryptocurrency sanctions.—Not later than 15 days after a congressional committee listed under subsection (h)(2) requests a briefing regarding the implementation of section 701 or 702, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission shall provide such briefing to such committee.

(a) Amendment.—Section 5(e) of the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014 (Public Law 113–278; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by striking “December 31, 2019” and inserting “December 31, 2025”.

(b) Termination.—The requirement to impose sanctions under this Act shall terminate on December 31, 2025.