This Act may be cited as the “U.S.-Israel Anti-Killer Drone Act of 2026”.

(a) Findings.—Congress finds the following:

(1) The growing arsenal of unmanned systems of Iran includes—

(A) unmanned systems that engage in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and

(B) armed unmanned systems capable of striking battlefield targets, including loitering munitions, also known as “suicide drones” or “one-way attack drones”.

(2) Iran-origin unmanned systems represent a threat to the Armed Forces and facilities of the United States in the Middle East, as well as to United States allies and partners such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

(3) In February 2018, Iran allegedly launched an armed unmanned aerial vehicle from Syria into Israeli airspace which was ultimately destroyed by Israeli warplanes.

(4) In September 2019, Iran launched cruise missiles and loitering munitions at key oil installations in Saudi Arabia.

(5) Throughout the takeover of Yemen by the Houthi, beginning in 2014 and continuing into the present, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds-Force, the al-Ghadir Missile Command of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force, and the Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has supported the capabilities of Yemeni rebels, including through the provision of unmanned systems and other relevant technology, such as cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. Such support enables the Houthis to routinely strike civilian targets in both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

(6) In January 2021, Iran-backed Shiite militia groups in Iraq launched armed unmanned aerial vehicles at Saudi Arabia.

(7) In March 2021, Iran attempted to send two delta-wing unmanned aerial vehicles toward Israel which were ultimately downed by Israeli warplanes over the territory of an undisclosed Arab country.

(8) In July 2021, Iran launched an attack employing unmanned aerial vehicles, including loitering munitions against a Liberian-flagged, Israeli-operated tanker, “M/T Mercer Street”, near the coast of Oman that killed two people, a British and a Romanian national.

(9) On November 1, 2021, the Secretary of Defense and the Defense Minister of Israel signed a memorandum of understanding establishing the United States-Israel Operations Technology-Working Group, which includes six sub-working groups, including sub-working groups focused on countering unmanned systems and directed energy capabilities.

(10) On March 27 and 28, 2022, Secretary of State Blinken met in Israel with counterparts from the governments of Israel, Bahrain, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Morocco to promote normalization in the region and declared, “Our commitment to the core principle that Iran can never acquire a nuclear weapon is unwavering. One way or another, we will continue to cooperate closely.”.

(11) In May 2022, Iran inaugurated an unmanned system factory in Tajikistan to manufacture and export the Ababil-2, a multipurpose unmanned system with reconnaissance, combat, and suicide capabilities.

(12) On June 2, 2022, Iran-backed Hezbollah sent three unmanned aerial vehicles toward the Israeli-controlled Karish gas field, one of which was intercepted by an F–16 fighter jet, and two of which were intercepted by Barak 8 missiles launched from the Sa’ar 5-class corvette “INS Eilat”.

(13) On July 2, 2022, the Israeli military reportedly shot down three unmanned aerial vehicles launched by Hezbollah in the vicinity of where an Israeli gas platform had been recently installed in the Mediterranean Sea.

(14) On July 14, 2022, the United States and Israel adopted the Joint Declaration on the U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership, reaffirming the unbreakable bonds between the two countries and the enduring commitment of the United States to the security of Israel.

(15) In late August 2022, Iran reportedly sent its first batch of Shahed-136 unmanned systems to Russia for use against Ukraine. While Russia is rebranding these systems the Geran-2, United States officials revealed the agreement in the summer of 2022.

(16) On September 12, 2022, Brigadier General Kioumars Heydari, who heads the ground forces of the Armed Forces of Iran, announced that the Armed Forces of Iran had developed the Arash-2 unmanned system specifically designed to attack Tel Aviv and Haifa.

(17) On November 13, 2022, and on February 10, 2023, Iran-origin unmanned systems allegedly targeted Israeli-owned oil tankers off the coast of Oman.

(18) Since 2022, Russia has used Iran-origin Shahed unmanned aerial vehicles equipped with enhanced navigation systems to evade Ukrainian air defenses, resulting in hundreds of civilian casualties.

(19) On February 14, 2023, United States forces in Syria reportedly shot down an Iran-origin unmanned aerial vehicle surveilling United States positions around oil facilities.

(20) On October 7, 2023, Hamas terrorists launched a brutal, unprovoked attack from Gaza into Israel, killing more than 1,200 people, including at least 30 Americans, according to the Israeli military and the Department of State. The attack involved a significant number of unmanned systems.

(21) Between late 2023 and 2024, United States forces in Iraq and Syria were repeatedly targeted by Iran-backed militias using armed unmanned systems, resulting in American casualties.

(22) In June 2025, Iran launched a series of unmanned system attacks against targets in Israel, including both military installations and critical infrastructure. The scale and coordination of the attack demonstrated the expanding operational capabilities of Iran.

(b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States should—

(1) enhance ongoing cooperation with Israel in researching, developing, and fielding, as expeditiously as possible, mutually beneficial technologies and capabilities to counter unmanned systems, for the purpose of addressing common military requirements and growing threats;

(2) exchange with Israel information about the evolving threat of Iran-origin unmanned systems;

(3) conduct joint training exercises and develop information-sharing mechanisms to maximize the exchange of technical expertise, data, and tactics related to emerging unmanned systems and associated threats;

(4) coordinate with acquisition program offices of the United States Armed Forces and Israeli military service departments, components, and commands to expedite the deployment of relevant systems and enhance military readiness; and

(5) use the United States-Israel Operations-Technology Working Group established pursuant to section 1299M(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116–283; 134 Stat. 4014), or any successor working group, as the epicenter of such efforts.

(c) Report on United States-Israel cooperation To counter unmanned systems.—Section 1278 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92; 133 Stat. 1702; 22 U.S.C. 8606 note) is amended—

(1) in subsection (b)(4), by striking “$55,000,000” and inserting “$100,000,000”;

(2) by redesignating subsections (e) and (f) as subsections (f) and (g), respectively; and

(3) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new subsections:

“(e) Annual reports.—The Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress on an annual basis a report containing—

“(1) a description of the activities authorized in subsection (a)(1) conducted during the preceding fiscal year, including—

“(A) an assessment of progress made by the United States and Israel in addressing threats and requirements relating to unmanned systems (as such term is defined in section 319 of title 14, United States Code);

“(B) an assessment of the harmonization of such activities authorized in subsection (a)(1) with other programs of the United States Government or programs of contractors of the Department of Defense;

“(C) an update on efforts to transition capabilities to acquisition program managers for fielding by the United States Armed Forces or Israeli military services, components, and commands; and

“(D) recommendations for future activities to be conducted under this section and associated funding; and

“(2) an assessment of the threat to the United States and Israel posed by unmanned aerial systems from Iran and associated proxies of Iran, including an assessment of deployed or otherwise available anti-unmanned aircraft capabilities of the United States or Israel and the adequacy of such capabilities to offset such threat.”.

(d) Unmanned system defined.—In this section, the term “unmanned system” has the meaning given that term in section 319 of title 14, United States Code.